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Monopolies: Interpreting the
Qualifying Clause of Section 7,
Clayton Act
By C. GIBSON DOWNING*
EXPRESSING CONCERN over the high level of economic concentra-
tion of American business and the trend toward an even higher
level of concentration through the use of the merger device,' Con-
gress, in December of 1950, amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act
to prohibit the acquisition by one corporation of the stock or
assets of another corporation "where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a mo-
nopoly."2 (Emphasis supplied) Through this amendment, Con-
gress intended "to limit future increases in the level of economic
concentration resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions"3
by prohibiting these practices when coupled with monopolistic
tendencies. 4 This same Congressional purpose, that of arresting,
by prohibiting specific trade practices having monopolistic tend-
encies, the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their
incipiency and before consummation,5 had attended the original
enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914. Section 7, however, prior
to the 1950 amendment had never provided an effective restraint
on corporate growth by merger.
* LL.B., University of Kentucky, 1956. Formerly co-editor of Kentucky Law
Journal. Associated with Stoll, Keenon and Park, Lexington, Kentucky.
1 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
2 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18 (1953). Prior to the amendment,
Section 7 prohibited only acquisitions of stock or other share capital where the
effect might be "to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose
stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line
of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18 (1946).
s Senate Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
4 Id., at 4. 5 Id. at 4-5.
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Several factors contributed to this near-total ineffectiveness
of the unamended Section 7. Of chief importance was the com-
plete failure of the section to prohibit either outright or indirect
acquisitions of corporate assets.' The vitality of the section in
respect to acquisitions of capital stock was seriously impaired by
decisions of the Supreme Court holding that the authority of the
administering agency, the Federal Trade Commission, was limited
to an order requiring divestiture of stock illegally held by the
violating corporation at the time the Commission's final order was
actually issued.7 Timely disposal by the violator of illegally held
stock ousted the Commission of jurisdiction, even though the
method used in disposing of the stock vested title to the physical
assets of the acquired company in the violating corporation.'
Old Section 7 prohibited only those acquisitions the effect of
which might be "to substantially lessen competition between the
corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation mak-
ing the acquisition."° (Emphasis supplied) A literal application
of this test of illegality would have made unlawful nearly every
merger between direct competitors on the ground that competition
between them not only would be lessened substantially, but
would be completely eliminated. To avoid this result, the courts,
in addition to retaining the statutory requirement of a substantial
lessening of competition between the acquiring and acquired
corporations, 0 construed the section to require a lessening of
competition in the industry as a whole." Thus, only horizontal
acquisitions, those between direct competitors, which were large
63 8 Stat. 731 (1914). Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 291 U.S. 587 (1934). Some proponents of the amendment to Sec-
tion 7 contended that the omission of assets was unintentional, either purely
inadvertent, Hearings on H.R. 2357 at 4, 15 (1949), or simply an historical ac-
cident resulting from the fact that prior to 1914 the common method of obtaining
control over a corporation was by stock acquisition, H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949). The better explanation for the omission would seem to
be that the purpose of Section 7 was to prevent formation of holding companies
which exercised corporate control through stock ownership. H.R. Rep. No. 627,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1914).
7 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra
note 6; Thatcher Manufacturing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U.S. 554
(1926).
8 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra
note 6.
9 88 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. See. 18 (1946).
10 International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
"1 International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 10; V.
Vivaudo, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 54 F. 2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931).
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enough to produce the proscribed effect on competition within
the entire industry affected by the acquisition were within the
purview of the section.'2 The section, so construed, proved to be
completely ineffective as a deterrent to corporate integration.
In amending Section 7, Congress made two basic changes.
The loophole respecting corporate asset acquisitions was closed.'3
More important, perhaps, the "acquiring-acquired" qualifying
language was deleted and a new test of illegality substituted: an
acquisition is now unlawful if "in any line of commerce in any sec-
tion of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition."1 4 This qualifying language used
by Congress in formulating this statutory test of illegality is not
new to the Clayton Act, but is virtually identical to the language
previously used in formulating similar tests under Sections 2 and
3 of the Act. Section 2 prohibits price discrimination "where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 1
Section 3 makes unlawful the use of tying or requirements con-
tracts the effect of which "may be to substantially lessen compe-
tition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 1
The legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended
that this new standard of illegality be stricter than the acquiring-
acquired test as applied under old Section 7.17 By altering the
qualifying language of the section, Congress removed those pro-
visions which appeared "to reach situations of little economic sig-
nificance," 8 thereby intending to secure a "broader construction
of the more fundamental provisions that are retained than has
12"Substantial lessening" was defined to require a showing that the effect
of the merger would be injurious to the public. U.S. v. Republic Steel Corp., 11
F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
I3 Section 7 now provides: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall ac-
quire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly." 64 Stat. 1125 (1950); 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18 (1953).
14 Ibid.
1 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 13
(1953).
16 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. See. 14 (1953).
17Senate Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950); H.R. Rep. No.
1191, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 8-9 (1949).
18Senate Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
been given in the past." 9 The members of the Senate Committee
reported a belief that the acquiring-acquired language of the old
section had been largely responsible "for the tendency of the
courts in cases under the section to revert to the Sherman Act
test."20 In the application of this new standard to cases arising
under the amended Section 7, decisions of the courts applying
this identical language to price discriminations, tying contracts
and requirements contracts under Sections 2 and 8 of the Clayton
Act can hardly be ignored. The mere fact that Congress chose to
adopt language which had acquired a specific meaning in respect
to other sections of the Clayton Act would support an inference
that the qualifying clause should be applied in a manner similar
to applications under those other sections. The House Report
seems to indicate such an intention in discussing this statutory
standard:
Under H.R. 2734, a merger or acquisition will be
unlawful if it may have the effect of either (a) substantially
lessening competition or (b) tending to create a monopoly.
These two tests of illegality are intended to be similar to
those which the courts have applied in interpreting the
same language as used in other sections of the Clayton
Act.21 (Emphasis supplied)
It is with the application of this statutory standard, in the light
of decisions construing the same language in cases arising under
Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, that this article is primarily
concerned.
Applications of the qualifying clause in cases arising under Sec-
tions 2 and 8.
Sections 2 and 8 of the Clayton Act both deal specifically with
trade practices encountered only in the marketing and distribut-
ing phases of commerce. Section 2 deals with price discrimina-
tions, which, within the meaning of the Act, occur when a seller
charges different prices for goods of "like grade and quality." -"
Such a discrimination is unlawful if it has the proscribed effect
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., Authorities generally agree that the acquiring-acquired test as ap-
plied by the courts was the same as, or very similar to, the test applied in Sherman
Act cases. See generally Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32
Colum. L. Rev. 179, 264 (1932).
21 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
22 Supra note 15.
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on competition, i.e., "may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce," 3 unless
it is justified by one of the specific factors set out within the sec-
tion, such as "cost of manufacture, sale or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities
are to such purchasers sold or delivered."24 The Supreme Court
has interpreted this section so that a mere showing that quantity
discounts result in price differentials between competing pur-
chasers, sufficient in amount to influence the resale price of the
product involved, is adequate to support a finding that the effect
of such price discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition.25 Thus, the effect of every price differential, however
minute, is, per se, to lessen competition, and if this differential
is sufficient in amount to influence the resale price, the effect of
the discrimination, per se, may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion in the line of commerce involved. The qualifying language
of Section 2 is satisfied by proof that a discrimination has been
made, plus proof that the amount of the discrimination is suf-
ficient to influence the resale price.
Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits the use of tying and
requirements contracts, the effect of which "may be to substanti-
ally lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce."2 Through the use of a tying contract, a supplier
can transmit a lawful monopolistic control, as in the case of a
patent or copyright, into related fields by refusing to sell or lease
the controlled item unless the purchaser or lessee agrees to take a
specified quantity of a "tied" product which is also available
from competitive'sources. A typical example of a tying contract
is presented in the case of International Salt Co. v. United
States.27 International Salt owned patents on certain salt-dis-
pensing machines which were valuable for use in manufacturing
processes. These were leased to manufacturers on condition that
only salt products of the lessor company would be used in the
machines. Sales of salt products under these contracts amounted
to $500,000 in 1944. Finding that the contracts foreclosed from
competitors of the defendant this amount of business, the Su-
23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.
25 Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
20 Supra note 16. 27332 U.S. 392 (1947).
19571
KENTucxy LAW JoURNAL
preme Court held that the arrangements violated Section 3,
stating:
Not only is price fixing unreasonable per se ...
but it is also unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors
from any substantial market. ... The volume of business
affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant
or insubstantial ... 28
Tying contracts, per se, lessen competition. If through the use
of these contracts a not insignificant or insubstantial segment of
the market is foreclosed from competition, there may be, per se,
a substantial lessening of competition as a result thereof.
The use of requirements or exclusive dealing contracts is for-
bidden by Section 3 in the same language as is the use of tying
contracts. Basically a requirements contract is one in which the
purchaser agrees to buy from a seller, and the seller agrees to sell
to the purchaser, all of the buyer's requirements of a given product
or line of products over a given period of time. An exclusive deal-
ing contract is one in which the purchaser, who purchases for
resale, agrees to handle exclusively the product or brand of
products of a single supplier.29 The most significant judicial con-
struction of the test of illegality of Section 3 as applied to require-
ments and exclusive dealing contracts appears in Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Standard Oil Company of California v.
United States30 (the Standard Stations case). Standard Oil of
California, the largest distributor of petroleum products in the
"Western" market,31 with 23% of the total volume of business,
secured exclusive dealing agreements with operators of 5,937 in-
dependent service stations within the area. In 1947, these "dealer"
stations accounted for gross sales of $57,696,233, an amount equal
to 6.7% of the total market volume. In an action brought by the
28 Id. at 396.
29For example, where an independent service station agrees to sell only
petroleum products and accessories furnished by a single distributor, the agree-
ment often accompanied by an agreement on the part of the distributor to paint
the physical plant of the purchaser in the colors and insignia of the supplier. The
independent station in effect becomes a "dealer' for the distributor. E.G. United
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd. in per
curiarn decision, Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922 (1952).
30 337 U.S. 293 (1949);
31 This "Western area included the following states: Arizona, California,
Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and Washington. The Supreme Court specifically
held that although Standard was the largest distributor in this area, its share of
the market was not so large that it would support a conclusion that Standard
occupied a dominant position in the market. Id. at 302.
[Vol. 46,
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United States under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3
of the Clayton Act,32 the District Court enjoined Standard Oil
from enforcing or entering into exclusive dealing contracts of this
type with independent dealers.33 The District Court held that the
requirement, under Section 3, of showing an actual or potential
lessening of competition or a tendency to establish a monopoly
was conclusively met by proof that the contracts covered a "sub-
stantial number of outlets and a substantial amount of products,
whether considered comparatively or not,"34 and that evidence
introduced for the purpose of proving a different probable effect
was irrelevant.
In reviewing this decision on writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court stated that:
The issue before us, therefore, is whether the re-
quirement of showing that the effect of the agreements
'may be to substantially lessen competition' may be met
simply by proof that a substantial portion of commerce is
affected or whether it must also be demonstrated that com-
petitive activity has actually diminished or probably will
diminish.35
The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, conclud-
ing that "the qualifying clause of Section 3 is satisfied by proof
that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the
line of commerce affected,"" and holding further that the 6.7% of
the market foreclosed by the agreements involved was such a
substantial share. This decision was subsequently reaffirmed in a
per curiam opinion in Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States.ar This
"quantitative substantiality" doctrine has been applied recently
in two cases arising under Section 3. In Dictograph Products, Inc.
v. Federal Trade Commission,3 8 the court held that an economic
analysis was irrelevant after it had been shown that the party
32 The Supreme Court decided the case solely on the ground that Section 3
of the Clayton Act had been violated, finding it unnecessary to consider the case
in relation to Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 314.3 3 United States v. Standard Oil Company of California, 78 F. Supp. 850
(S.D. Cal. 1948).
34 Id. at 875, Standard Oil Company of California v. United States, supra note
30, at 298.
35 Supra note 30, at 299.
30 Id. at 314. This test has become generally known at the "quantitative
substantiality" test.
87 343 U.S. 922 (1952).
38 217 F. 2d. 821 (2d Cir. 1954).
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using the exclusive dealing contracts accounted for a substantial
share of the business in the particular line of commerce through
such contracts. The statutory standard was construed in the same
manner in Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.
30
The essence of this interpretation of the statutory standard in
respect to requirements and exclusive dealing contracts has been
best stated by Judge Mars in his opinion in Transamerica Corpo-
ration v. Board of Governors:4"
The use of exclusive dealing contracts per se less-
ens competition, however, so that the fact of lessening need
not be proven. For one who agrees to purchase all his re-
quirements from a single seller is legally barred from pur-
chasing them from anyone else and is consequently elimi-
nated entirely from the competitive market. In order to
establish a substantial lessening of competition in such a
case, therefore, it is only necessary in addition to prove
that the sales covered by the exclusive dealing contracts
amount to a substantial portion of the total involved in the
competitive market area. This is precisely what was held
in the Standard Oil case.
Thus the same basic determination which governed the applica-
tion of this qualifying language in price discrimination and tying
contract cases governs the application of the same language in
requirements and exclusive arrangement cases. Price discrimina-
tions, it has been determined by the Supreme Court, per se lessen
competition, and the qualifying language, as it appears in Section
2, is satisfied by proof that a discrimination has been made and
that it is one sufficient to influence the resale price.41 Tying con-
tracts, per se, lessen competition, and the qualifying clause, as it
appears in Section 3, is satisfied by proof that a tying contract
has been used and that a not "insignificant or insubstantial"
volume of business has been affected thereby.42 Likewise, the use
of a requirements or exclusive dealing contracts, per se, lessen
competition, and once the use of such an arrangement is shown,
"the qualifying clause of Section 8 is satisfied by proof that corn-
30 217 F. 2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). In following the Standard Stations test, the
court stated at 872 that "it is not necessary to show the actual impact which a
'requirements contract has on competition, but that it is sufficient if it possesses
the potentiality to impede a substantial amount of competitive activity."
40206 F. 2d 163, 170 (3rd Cir. 1953) Cert. deied 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
41 Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Company, supra note 25.
4 2 Supra note 27.
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petition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of
commerce affected.143 None of these practices is illegal per se.
The Supreme Court has determined merely that the use of each
practice, per se, lessens competition. This omits the necessity of
proving, through economic factors, the fact of a probable lessen-
ing of competition, and renders relevant only evidence which
bears on the question of the substantiality of this presumed effect.
Application of the qualifying clause in cases arising under the
amended Section 7.
Only three cases involving this problem, two by the courts and
one by the Federal Trade Commission, have been decided under
Section 7 since the amendment. One of these, Transamerica
Corporation v. Board of Governors,4 4 was actually decided under
the unamended section, the complaint being issued prior to the
amendment. Transamerica appealed from an order of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System which had directed
the corporation to divest itself of the stock of a number of banks
which had been acquired by the corporation. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit reversed the order of the Board on
ground that the government had not shown that the effect of the
stock acquisition was substantially to lessen competition between
the acquired firms, the prescribed test under old Section 7.45 The
court rejected the contention of the government that the quantita-
tive substantiality test of the Standard Stations case should be ap-
plied to old Section 7 cases, observing:
[T]he lessening of competition and the tendency
to monopoly must appear from the circumstances of the
particular case and be found as facts before the sanctions
of the statutes may be invoked. Evidence of mere size and
participation in a substantial share of the line of business
involved, the 'quantitative substantiality' theory relied on
by the Board, is not enough.4 6
43 Standard Oil Company of California v. United States, supra note 30 at 314.
44 Supra note 40.
45 In addition to prohibiting the acquisition by one corporation of the stock
of another corporation where the effect might be "to substantially lessen com-
petition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition" old Section 7 also prohibited the acquisition by one
corporation of the stock of "two or more corporations engaged in commerce
where the effect of such acquisition ...may be to substantially lessen com-
petition between such corporations ... whose stock ... is so acquired . . ." This
is the branch of the section under which the complaint in Transamerica was made.
38 Stat. 731 Sec. 7 (1914); 15 U.S.C. See. 18 (1946).4 6 Supra note 40 at 170.
1957]
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Thus the court rejected the contention of the government that
mergers, per se, lessen competition, and held that the fact of a
probability of a lessening of competition as a result of a particular
merger must appear from the circumstances of the case.
The only litigation reaching the courts under amended Sec-
tion 7 involved a suit by the Hamilton Watch Co. to enjoin the
Benrus Watch Co. from voting a sizable block of Hamilton stock
which the latter had acquired, on ground that the acquisition
violated the section. The District Court granted a preliminary
injunction,47 which was sustained on appeal.48 Neither the opinion
of the District Court or the opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit attempts to make an analysis of the qualifying
language of Section 7, the opinion of the appellate court contain-
ing this caveat:
Although we now indulge in no ultimate conclu-
sion, we believe the amendment of Section 7 in 1950 casts
doubt on decisions ... interpreting that section as it stood
previously. The Senate Committee Report stated that the
intent of the amendment was 'to cope with monopolistic
tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have at-
tained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceed-
ing.' Interference at an early stage, if possible, seems the
paramount aim.49
In Matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,50 the Federal Trade Com-
mission examined the qualifying language of Section 7 extensively,
and rendered a rather elaborate opinion setting forth the Com-
mission's views as to how this language should be interpreted.
Pillsbury, the second largest flour milling company in the United
States, acquired in 1951 and 1952 the assets of two leading com-
petitors, Ballard and Ballard Company and Duff's Baking Mix
Division of the American Home Products Corporation. In re-
versing the trial examiner's dismissal of the complaint charging
Pillsbury with a violation of amended Section 7, the Commission
rejected the Standard Stations' quantitative substantiality test as
being applicable to Section 7 cases, holding that "it would not be
sufficient to show that an acquiring and an acquired company to-
47 Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.
1953).4
i Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F. 2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
49 Id. at 741.
50 Federal Trade Commission Docket No. 6000 (1953).
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gether control a substantial amount of sales, or that a substantial
portion of commerce is affected"51 and that there "must be a case-
by-case examination of all relevant factors in order to ascertain
the probable economic consequences" 5 2 of each merger attacked
as a violation of the statute. The Pillsbury case, it would seem,
follows precisely the reasoning of the court in the Transamerica
case, each rejecting the notion that all mergers, per se, lessen
competition, and each requiring a showing, by economic factors,
of a probability of lessening of competition as a result of the par-
ticular merger involved.
The common denominator in the application of this qualifying
clause in the cases arising under Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton
Act is a judicial determination that some lessening of competition
is implicit in each use of one of the specific trade practices for-
bidden by those sections. If the judiciary is to follow the legisla-
tive intent as expressed by the House Committee that the tests
of illegality of Section 7, as amended, "be similar to those which
the courts have applied in interpreting the same language as used
in other sections of the Clayton Act,"53 this basic determination
must be made in respect to mergers. If mergers, like tying, re-
quirements and exclusive dealing contracts, per se, lessen com-
petition, then and only then can the qualifying clause of Section
7 be applied in a manner similar to that in which this same lan-
guage has been applied in cases arising under Sections 2 and 3, so
that the only evidence relevant in determining whether the effect
of a particular merger "may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion" will be evidence as to the magnitude of the merging com-
panies.
But is a probable lessening of competition implicit in every
merger? The answer to this question logically depends upon the
type of merger involved, whether horizontal, vertical or con-
glomerate. As previously stated, prior to the 1950 amendment,
because of the requirement of showing a probability of a sub-
stantial lessening of competition between the acquiring and ac-
quired corporations, the section prohibited only horizontal acqui-
sitions having the proscribed effect on competition. As amended,
the section makes unlawful mergers which may have the pro-
51 Id. at 8. 52 Id. at 9.
53 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
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scribed effect "in any line of commerce in any section of the coun-
try." In discussing this phase of the proposed amendment, the
House Report states:
[I]n the proposed bill, as has been pointed out
above, the test of the effect on competition between the
acquiring and the acquired firm has been eliminated. One
reason for this action was to make it clear that this bill is
not intended to prohibit all acquisitions among competitors.
But there is a second reason, which is to make it clear that
the bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions,
vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal, which
have the specified effects of substantially lessening com-
petition. ....
If, for example, one or a number of raw-material pro-
ducers purchases firms in a fabricating field (i.e., 'forward
vertical' acquisition), and if as a result thereof competition
in that fabricating field is substantially lessened in any sec-
tion of the country, the law would be violated, even though
there did not exist any competition between the acquiring
(raw material) and the acquired (fabricating) firms.
The same principles would, of course, apply to back-
ward vertical and conglomerate acquisitions and mergers.5 4
Thus, under the amended section, if as a result of a merger a
probability of a substantial lessening of competition occurs in any
line of commerce5s affected thereby, the acquisition is unlawful.
In the case of a purely horizontal merger only one line of com-
merce, that in which the companies involved competed prior to
the merger, is affected. But vertical acquisitions affect more than
one line of commerce, and an adverse effect on competition can
be produced by such an acquisition either in the line of commerce
in which the acquiring corporation was engaged prior to the
acquisition, or in the line of commerce in which the acquired
corporation was engaged. 6 This, it would seem, is the key factor
54 Id. at 11.
55 "Line of commerce" has been defined in the abstract as "the manufacture
or distribution of a product or service distinct from all other products or services."
For further practical elaboration of this definition see Note, 52 Colum. L.R. 766,
778 (1952).
56 It has been effectively urged that the test of illegality has no practical
application in cases involving conglomerate acquisitions. Adelman, "Acquire the
Whole or Any Part of the Stock or Assets of Another Corporation," Proceedings
of the Annual Meeting of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar
Association, p. 111 (1953). In the light of this argument, there has been no at-
tempt herein to interpret Section 7s applicability in conglomerate merger cases.
[vol. 46,
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in the application of the qualifying clause to cases arising under
the amended Section 7.
Both the court in Transamerica and the Federal Trade Com-
mission in Pillsbury decided that mergers do not, per se, lessen
competition. In the former, the court held that "the lessening of
competition... must appear from the circumstances of the par-
ticular case,"'57 and in the latter, the Commission stated that there
"must be a case-by-case examination of all relevant factors in
order to ascertain the probable economic consequences."58 In
both of these cases, the tribunal was considering the probable
effect on competition of a merger of corporations which had pre-
viously been in direct competition. In reaching the conclusion
that no probability of a lessening of competition was implicit in
the merger involved in the Pillsbury case, the Commission stated:
The impact of a tying contract or a requirements
contract is different from that of an acquisition. The force
of the former falls principally upon buyers or upon com-
petitors of the company which imposes the contract, the
effect of such contracts is thus to cut off these competitors
from what would otherwise be part of their natural market.
In contrast, an acquisition seldom has such an immediate
impact upon competitors. The reason that acquisitions are,
under certain circumstances, to be regarded as illegal is not
because of their effect on buying and selling practices but
because of their probable effect on competition 9
Basically a horizontal acquisition involves only a change in owner-
ship of one company competing in the line of commerce affected.
There is no "foreclosure of competition" such as is present in the
use of tying or requirements contracts. The result is simply that
one enlarged corporation takes the place of two smaller corpora-
tions in competing for the business available, and this fact, in and
of itself, cannot support a valid inference that competition prob-
ably will be lessened thereby. As put by the Report of the At-
torney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws:
[M]ergers are a common form of growth; they
may lessen, increase, or have no effect upon competition.
57 Supra note 40 at 170.58 Supra note 51 at 9.
59 Supra note 51 at 7-8.
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A merger as such involves no necessary connotations of
coercion, dominance, or lack of effective competitive pres-
sures. In addition, mergers may ease from the market com-
panies which have failed in the competitive struggle and
thus prevent potential bankruptcies. Finally, they may spur
operating economies by spreading overhead costs or en-
abling improved technology or management.80
Insofar as horizontal movements by acquisition of stock or assets
are concerned, the fact of a probable lessening of competition
must be proven.61 In this respect the opinions in Transamerica
and Pillsbury are sound, and most authorities writing on the sub-
ject adopt this position.2
These same considerations, however, should not be controlling
when the acquisition involved is a vertical one. Simply stated, a
vertical integration is a combination under one management of
the business functions which could be performed at different
levels in the process of obtaining the raw materials, converting
them into finished goods and distributing the finished goods to
the ultimate consumer. 63 Thus acquisitions by a manufacturer of
a company producing the needed raw materials, or by a whole-
saler or distributor of a retail outlet, are vertical acquisitions. Two
lines of commerce are affected by vertical movements of this type-
and if competition in either of the lines of commerce affected may
be substantially lessened thereby, the acquisition is unlawful even
if competition in the other line of commerce affected be actually
increased. Vertical acquisitions, like those trade practices which
are forbidden by Sections 2 and 3 and unlike horizontal acquisi-
tions, have an effect, at some level, on the marketing and dis-
tributing phases of commerce.
60 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws, Chapter I, Mergers, 124-125 (1955).
61 For an excellent discussion of the economic factors generally relevant in
determining the probable effect on competition of such a merger see, Report of
the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, supra, note 60 at
125-128, and Barnes, 'Economic Issues in the Regulation of Acquisitions and
Mergers," 14 Ohio State L.J. 279, 288-306 (1958).62 Adelman, "Acquire the Whole or Any Part of the Stock or Assets of
Another Corporation," supra note 56; McAllister, "Where the Effect May Be To
Substantially Lessen Competition Or Tend To Create A Monopoly," Proceedings
of the Annual Meeting of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar
Association, 124 (1953); Report of the Attorney Generals National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws, supra note 60, among others.
63See generally Adelman, "Integration and Antitrust Policy," 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 27 (1949).
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In the Pillsbury case, the Federal Trade Commission went to
some length to distinguish between the impact of tying and re-
quirements contracts and the impact of acquisitions. The crux
of the distinction seems to be that the contracts forbidden by Sec-
tion 3 "cut off from these competitors what would otherwise be
part of their natural market," while mergers seldom have "such
an immediate impact on competitors.""- Actually, this distinction
is valid only in respect to horizontal acquisitions, the subject mat-
ter of the litigation then before the Commission. A vertical ac-
quisition, like an exclusive dealing contract, cuts off from com-
petitors a part of what would otherwise be their natural market.
Unlike horizontal acquisitions, vertical integrations of this sort
do involve a foreclosure of competition in one of the lines of com-
merce affected. The only appreciable difference in the effect on
competition produced by vertical acquisitions and the effect pro-
duced by requirements and exclusive dealing contracts is that the
former affect competition permanently while the latter affect it
only for the term specified by the contracts. The court in the
Transamerica case agreed that the use of exclusive dealing con-
tracts per se lessens competition because "one who agrees to pur-
chase all his requirements from a single seller is legally barred
from purchasing them from anyone else and is consequently
eliminated entirely from the competitive market."65 Obviously
the same effect on competition is produced when the single seller
referred to merely purchases the retail outlet instead of securing
an exclusive dealing contract. Vertical acquisitions, under this
reasoning of the court, must per se lessen competition.
It has been argued that mergers carry no necessary connota-
tions of coercion which often accompany the use of tying or re-
quirements contracts. The investment of capital involved in an
acquisition has been said to be a factor calling for a different test
in the case of mergers than has been applied to cases involving
contracts the use of which is forbidden by Section 3. The legality
of a particular acquisition, however, is to be determined solely by
its probable effect on competition, and the motives behind the
acquisition are wholly irrelevant.6 As vertical acquisitions do
04 Supra note 51 at 7. 65 Supra note 40.
6 McElroy, "Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Oil Industry," 5 Baylor
L. Rev. 121, 137-139 (1953).
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foreclose competition in one of the two lines of commerce affected
thereby, the quantitative substantiality test of Section 8 is fully
applicable. Foreclosure of a segment of the market from com-
petition, under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Stand-
ard Stations case, diminishes the competitive opportunity in that
market by an amount equal to the volume of business so affected.
It is from this decrease in the total competitive opportunity that
the conclusive presumption of a probable lessening of competi-
tion is drawn. There being such a foreclosure of competition in
vertical acquisitions, the qualifying language of Section 7, as
amended, can be applied in cases involving these acquisitions in
a manner similar to that in which the same language has been
applied in cases arising under Sections 2 and 8. Proof that a
vertical acquisition has been made can be tantamount to proof
that competition probably will be lessened. The only evidence
which then will be relevant in determining whether the effect of
the particular acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion will be evidence as to the market shares of the corporations
involved.
